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Social protection has come to feature more and more prominently on international and national development agendas. This 
quest for social protection in developing countries raises on important question: how can social protection act as an instrument 
for redistribution of wealth at the national level? The redistributive potential of a social protection mechanism will determine to 
a great extent its sustainability, ownership and impact on inequality, as well as its contribution to financing development. 
Assessing and enhancing this redistributive potential requires a multi-dimensional analysis and approach, encompassing 
political, technical, institutional and financial considerations.
Introduction 
Understanding the redistributive potential of 
social protection systems in a developing country 
is easier said than done. Existing insights on 
redistribution through social protection are often 
based on experiences in high income welfare 
states. Research looking into the different pat-
terns and dynamics of the development and 
impact of social policy in low- and middle-income 
countries is far less advanced (Bender, 
Kaltenborn, & Pfleiderer, 2013, p. 33).  
This policy brief reports on a two-phased 
research combining conceptual work (Fonteneau 
& Van Ongevalle, 2015) with case studies in 
Senegal and Morocco in order to build and test a 
theoretical framework that can guide the assess-
ment of the redistributive potential of social pro-
tection mechanisms in a developing context. The 
research aims to offer academics as well develop-
ment practitioners a tool to enhance their insights 
in redistribution through social protection sys-
tems and how to support it. 
Introducing decentralized 
universal health coverage in 
Senegal 
The overall Senegalese social protection system is 
underdeveloped and presenting significant gaps. 
Salary workers in the formal sector are best off, 
with access to social insurance that covers risks 
related to birth, health, work accidents or work-
related sickness, and old age. Some social assis-
tance provisions exist, accessible to different vul-
nerable groups and mostly aimed at providing 
access to basic health care and offering in some 
instances family allowances. However, recently 
there have been important evolutions in social 
protection policy. 
On the initiative of newly-elected president 
Macky Sall, anno 2013 the Ministry of Health and 
Social Action drew up a Strategic Plan for the 
Development of Universal Health Coverage in 
Senegal. The plan aims for a major reform in the 
health pillar of social protection with the intro-
duction of universal health coverage. It is built 
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around three axis: 1) improving access to free ser-
vices (gratuités), 2) strengthening the mandatory 
health insurance for the private sector, and 
3) building decentralized health insurance 
delivered through mutual health organization. 
The latter is referred to as the project for 
‘Extension of the health coverage through mutual 
health organisations in the context of 
decentralisation’ or DECAM. 
Assessing the redistributive potential of DECAM 
required a multi-dimensional analysis. Techni-
cally, DECAM represents a choice for a universal 
health insurance system. In principle this is a good 
foundation for redistribution but a more in-depth 
analysis of its technical dimensions shows that 
DECAM is specifically designed for the informal 
sector, meaning the heterogeneity of the insured 
beneficiaries will be low and hence so will the 
potential for redistribution. DECAM will mostly 
cover rural, informal workers confronted with 
similar precarious working conditions and liveli-
hood risks. Another features that implies redistri-
bution, is the inclusion of poor and vulnerable 
groups in DECAM, financed by the state. How-
ever, the inclusion of the poor and vulnerable in 
the same mechanism that covers the informal and 
rural sector further increases the high risks 
DECAM is exposed to. The fusion of mecha-
nisms covering the formal and informal workers, 
or the inclusion of the poor and vulnerable 
groups in the health insurance covering the for-
mal sector workers, would have distributed risks 
and increased potential for redistribution between 
different socio-economic population groups. A 
mandatory insurance would also have increase 
heterogeneity and thus the potential for redistri-
bution potential.  
An analysis of the financial dimension does 
show potential for redistribution between differ-
ent socio-economic population groups: DECAM 
will be financed through a combination of budget 
reallocation, increased (indirect) tax revenue and 
improving tax collection capacity, extending 
membership contributions and the use of aid and 
transfer. A more concrete and calculated financial 
plan was lacking. In general terms it can be said 
that the use of tax income to subsidize the health 
insurance of the informal sector and poor and 
vulnerable groups definitely is a strong redistrib-
utive element. The significant involvement of dif-
ferent international development partners, alt-
hough problematic from a sustainability perspec-
tive, entails international redistribution. A 
thorough assessment of redistribution is however 
impeded by the lack of a more detailed financial 
plan including figures on the respective weight of 
these different financing sources. 
The institutional dimension reveals a challenge 
for redistribution. There is a complex and tense 
interplay within and between the different institu-
tional actors charged with the implementation, 
management and governance of a social protec-
tion mechanism. These and other institutional 
challenges, such as the long-term viability of 
newly erected mutual health organisations, are 
underestimated. Yet, the success of DECAM will 
depend on establishing an actual partnership 
between the central government agency, the local 
authorities and the mutual health organisations. 
Additionally, the relation between DECAM and 
other social protection mechanisms (e.g. Family 
Security Grants, free health care) is not being fine-
tuned, whereas these measures will interfere with 
DECAM. This also illustrates that pursuing redis-
tribution in one mechanism does not necessarily 
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imply a redistributive social protection system as 
a whole.  
From the case study it is clear that politics have 
shaped and continue to shape the policy formula-
tion and implementation of DECAM, and that 
these political dynamics are crucial to understand 
the technical, financial and institutional choices. 
Political factors that have clearly played a role 
include: 1) the rise of social protection on the 
international development agenda and the 
emphasis on universal health coverage in key 
institutions such as the World Health Organisa-
tion; 2) the long track record of donor involve-
ment in the development of mutual health organ-
isations, which contributed to the development of 
a network (an epistemic community) of profes-
sional and community-based mutual health 
organisations, expert resource persons, favoura-
bly-disposed policy makers and financial and 
technical partners in support of the idea of mutu-
alism; 3) the presidential promise to boost cover-
age, creating momentum as well as the high time 
pressure to move ahead; 4) the fact that previ-
ously formulated policy documents featuring the 
development of mutual health organisations were 
available at the time policy formulation 
accelerated; 5) the trade unions that did not lobby 
for the inclusion of the informal sector but 
instead opted to protect the health insurance in 
the formal sector from absorbing additional risks 
and from changes in governance possible weak-
ening union position; 6) the civil society that did 
not have a strong track record on social protec-
tion and possibly lacked capacity and legitimacy 
to really influence the policy formulation; 7) the 
importance of the principle of decentralization 
embedded in Senegalese public policy; 8) the 
absence of redistribution as a guiding idea in the 
entire policy process. 
Building health insurance and 
health assistance in Morocco 
The Moroccan social protection system is consid-
ered fragmented, favouring the wealthiest house-
holds, limited in scope and coverage and poorly 
targeted. Formal private and public sector work-
ers are most protected, through social insurance. 
Some social assistance is provided for the poor 
and vulnerable groups. The most significant 
recent development in Moroccan social protec-
tion policy has been the adoption of Law 65.00 in 
2002 on Basic Medical Coverage. This law has 
resulted in the introduction of a mandatory health 
insurance (AMO) for the formal sector and the 
establishment of a medical assistance scheme for 
the economically destitute (RAMED). The 
expansion of the latter to the national level and 
the expansion of former to other target groups 
(e.g. independent workers and students) are still 
work in progress.  
A first striking observation, from a technical per-
spective, is the fragmentation in the Moroccan 
system. Different target groups (public sector, 
private sector, independent workers, poor, 
extreme poor) are served by different mecha-
nisms. The long term goal may be gradual harmo-
nisation and convergence, leading to a unified sys-
tem, but very few attempts to transcend the dif-
ferent silos and to establish redistribution 
between the different socio-economic population 
groups can be observed so far. This resonated 
with how key officials formulate the govern-
ment’s priorities: “Let’s begin with solidarity 
between the sick and the healthy. Maybe after-
ward we can work on solidarity between the rich 
and the poor”. 
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That redistribution between the sick and the 
healthy is indeed being increased by the current 
reforms: social insurance (AMO) in the formal 
sector has been made mandatory, and the public 
sector mechanism will come to include students 
and retirees in its population. This increases the 
heterogeneity of the different beneficiary groups. 
But when looking for redistribution that pro-
motes equal rights, another observation comes 
up. The medical assistance scheme for the eco-
nomically destitute (RAMED) did indeed 
increased access to health services for the poor, 
as the spectacular rise in demand can show. How-
ever, the choices made by the Moroccan govern-
ment have also consolidated a dichotomy 
between different population groups, giving some 
population groups more rights and choices, while 
limiting the rights and choices of others. Benefi-
ciaries of the mandatory health insurance can 
access private and public health care providers 
wherever they want, whereas beneficiaries of 
RAMED can only access the public sector in a 
specific geographical region. This is especially 
problematic because of the lack of service in the 
public sector and because the supply of health 
services is geographically badly distributed, leav-
ing some areas with hardly any services and con-
centrating the services in major cities. As one high 
ranking official chose to phrase it: “We believe it 
is normal that whoever is credit worthy gets 
access to the best system and the most options. 
Whoever is payed for by the state, will have to 
settle with what is offered”. Although unclear 
how influential the underlying idea on the respec-
tive roles of the state and the individual, it does 
illustrate the important role of ideas, norms and 
values in setting the scene for a specific policy. 
The analysis of the financial dimension rein-
forces the doubts regarding the redistributive 
potential of the Basic Medical Coverage as cur-
rently being implemented. The health assistance 
(RAMED) is partially funded by the state budget 
and can hence be considered tax-funded to some 
extent. But in the light of the clearly insufficient 
funding (leading to strong pressure on the public 
health care providers) and the ongoing discus-
sions on the introduction of a moderating ticket 
in RAMED, this seems a very half-hearted 
attempt at redistribution. Additionally, because of 
the bad image of the public sector the flow of 
resources in the health insurance is going mostly 
to the private health sector, further reinforcing 
the gap between private and public health care 
providers.  
Different institutional hitches also affect redis-
tributive potential. Firstly, the fragmentation and 
the lack of coordination have impeded a smooth 
implementation of the reform especially during its 
first decade, and especially with regard to 
RAMED. Secondly, institutionally, RAMED has 
not been not well-imbedded. It does not have a 
predictable and reliable funding source, it does 
not have a regulator, the managing role of the 
National Agency for Health Insurance is being 
undermined and the implementation of RAMED 
on the ground has not been supported by addi-
tional resources but has mostly just been added to 
the work load of local public servants. 
Politics clearly have shaped and continue to 
shape the policy formulation and implementation 
of Basic Medical Coverage reform. Political fac-
tors that have clearly played a role include: 
1) social unrest and public pressure proceeded 
different accelerations in the reform process 
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(during the 90s in response to the structural 
adjustment plans; and in 2011 with the Arab 
Spring); 2) change makers within the 
administration played in important role in 
building political consensus on a system for basic 
medical coverage, and in keeping RAMED on the 
political agenda; 3) the support of the King and 
the trade unions was key to expand the scope of 
the policy discussion and include coverage of the 
poor and the informal sector; 4) the existence of 
strong institutions (mutual health organisations) 
backed by the trade unions was an important 
argument in favour of a cumulative reform that 
would gradually expand coverage and evolve 
toward a unified system in the long term; 5) aside 
from trade unions, civil society organisations have 
played a very limited role. This can be explained 
because they lacked expertise on the topic, but 
also because they were not actively consulted or 
included in the policy formulation process.  
Theoretical framework 
In line with previous research (Hickey, 2008; 
Lavers & Hickey, 2015), this study finds that the 
redistributive potential of a social protection 
mechanism is determined by technical, institu-
tional, financial factor that are, in turn, largely 
shaped by politics. This includes formal as well as 
informal politics at the global, regional, national 
and local level. This has been summarized and 
visualized in figure 1.1 below that presents a the-
oretical framework to analyse the redistributive 
potential of social protection mechanisms. 
The technical dimension refers to the choices 
that have been made to achieve a certain social 
protection policy objective. These choices relate 
to the type of mechanism (assis-
tance/insurance/employment) that has been 
selected, its scope (universal/targeted), the target-
ing approach and methodology, the governance 
structure, and the organization of the service pro-
vision and delivery. One important issue to take 
into account in this dimension is whether a bal-
ance is pursued between expanding coverage, 
improving the generosity and quality of benefits 
and achieving equity in access to these benefits 
(Franzoni Martínez & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2014). 
Another important issue pertains to the risk of 
eroding the broader public support when mecha-
nisms do not benefit middle-class, referred to as 
the paradox of redistribution (Cantillon, Van 
mechelen, Pintelon, & Van den Heede, 2013; 
Franzoni Martínez & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2014). 
This technical and operational dimension over-
laps partly with the institutional dimension that 
covers the different institutions involved in (or 
strangely absent from) the implementation, man-
agement, coordination, and evaluation of social 
protection policy measures. This includes the task 
allocation between different institutions, their 
respective mandate, (financial) autonomy, and 
power. It also comprises the mechanisms for par-
ticipation of different stakeholders, the arrange-
ments for ensuring accountability, monitoring 
and evaluation, and the coordination between the 
different social protection domains and mecha-
nisms. The role of institutions in development is 
key, and this goes for social protection as well, but 
behind institutions lie politics. A too technocratic 
approach to the institutional dimension will 
obscure how institutions are in fact the battle-
ground between different interest groups. 
Equally key is the financial set-up envisioned to 
finance the social protection mechanism. How 
will the necessary resources be generated? How 
predictable and sustainable are these resource 
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flows? What is the respective weight of domestic 
resources and external financial support provided 
by donors? Although the latter can be seen as a 
form of international redistribution, the former is 
key to ensure nationally owned and sustainable 
social protection systems. This study was not able 
to include an in-depth discussion of the different 
fiscal options and their implications for redistri-
bution.  
Last but not least, the framework shows the 
importance of the political dimension. Conse-
quently this study subscribes to the argument 
“that politics need to be at the centre of efforts to 
understand social protection in low income coun-
tries and the evident variation in country expe-
rience.” (Lavers & Hickey, 2016). Politics are key 
to understand the available policy space, the 
choice for specific policy options, and the ups and 
downs in the implementation. In that sense, the 
political dimension is dominant, and present in all 
other dimensions as well. This emphasis on the 
political dimension also resonates with the need, 
put forward by different academics and practi-
tioners, for a better inclusion of politics in devel-
opment cooperation (Hudson, Marquette, & 
Waldock, 2016; Menocal, 2014; Ramalingam & 
Bound, 2016).  
The political dimensions covers the negotiation 
between different groups in society, leading to the 
formation of a specific political settlement that 
will determine the redistribution of resources 
within society. It also includes the interaction 
between national policy actors such as the gov-
ernment, administration, political parties, Parlia-
ment, the organized civil society (NGOs, trade 
unions, social movements) and the other 
‘unorganised’ social forces (including elites, spon-
taneous popular movements, influential leaders, 
etc.), as well as international and actors. The 
interaction between these actors will determine 
what policy coalition forms in favour of which 
social protection mechanisms, and will determine 
the selection, design and implementation of social 
protection policy options. These interactions can 
be formal (consultations, elections, propositions, 
etc.) as well as informal (lobbying, influencing, 
etc.), and they are influenced by ideas and mental 
models.  
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Figure 1 A theoretical framework to analyse the redistributive potential of social protection mechanisms 
Source Adapted from Fonteneau & Van Ongevalle (2016)  
 
Key observations  
Three major observations emerged from this two-
phased study on the redistributive potential of social 
protection: 
1. In the case studies efforts are ongoing in the 
areas of expanding coverage, improving gener-
osity of benefits and improving equity of access, 
but there is a strong focus on expanding cover-
age. A better balance with generosity of benefits 
and equity of access is not explicitly and promi-
nently pursued by national policymakers nor 
technical and financial partners. 
2. Politics are indispensable for understanding 
social protection policy in low- and middle 
income countries, and for assessing how the 
development of redistributive social protection 
can be supported. Investigating this political 
dimension requires awareness of the driving 
role of political settlements, the role of both for-
mal and informal power dynamics and institu-
tions, the role of international and transnational 
actors, and the role of ideas. There is very little 
publicly available evidence publicly that tech-
nical and financial partners supporting social 
protection reforms are aware and currently 
engage with these dynamics. 
  
3. Although some possibilities for participation in 
the development of social policy may exist, the 
actual involvement of stakeholders is limited: 
not all stakeholders are included and/or their 
possibilities for actually influencing policy are 
restricted. This has to do with a reductive inter-
pretation of what stakeholders are relevant and 
a lack of proactive stakeholder engagement on 
the one hand. On the other hand, stakeholders, 
and specifically civil society organisations, don’t 
have social protection prominently on their 
radar or lack capacity and expertise to engage in 
the policy process in a meaningful way.  
 
Recommendations 
1. Support a maximalist interpretation of redistributive social protection 
Initiate and/or support a transparent reflection on the redistributive potential of different social protec-
tion policy options and on the trade-offs being made between coverage, generosity and equity. This can 
promote a more holistic, balanced interpretation of redistribution in social protection and can avoid a too 
one-sided and technocratic focus on expanding coverage. 
2. Give politically-smart support for social protection reforms 
Institutions matter for development and behind institutions lie politics. Efforts to support redistributive 
social protection need to be politically-smart. This requires a strong analysis of the political environment 
in which a social protection mechanism is put on the agenda, operationalised and implemented, as well as 
the development of clear strategies on how to engage with these political dynamics and how to enable the 
own organization to do so. 
3. Promote a more inclusive and meaningful stakeholder participation 
Supporting the involvement of all stakeholders in social protection policy processes contributes to a com-
prehensive and shared assessment of the social protection situation on the ground and promotes a wider 
debate on the policy options to move forward. This is important for the development and implementation 
of a suitable and feasible policy options that enjoy public support. Providing tools to guide such stake-
holder participation (e.g. the assessment-based national dialogue) or strengthening capacity of stakehold-
ers to participate can contribute to this. 
The theoretical framework presented in the study has proven to be useful tool to guide the comprehen-
sive assessment of the redistributive potential of social protection mechanisms, which is an crucial first 
step in putting these recommendations in practice. 
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